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Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? 
Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage 
Advocacy from the History                              
of Polygamy 
CHESHIRE CALHOUN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In United States history, there have been four important bars to civil 
marriage.  First, during the period of U.S. slavery, marriages between 
slaves, though informally celebrated, were not legally recognized.1  The 
bar to civil marriage between slaves was part of slaves’ general legal 
incapacity to enter into contracts, and was not an expression of social 
disapproval of slave marriages.2  Indeed, slaveholders sometimes promoted 
informal marriage unions between slaves.3  The three other marriage 
bars, however, specifically targeted relationships that were the subjects 
of intense social disapproval and were treated by lawmakers as 
dangerous to societal order. 
Bars to marriage across racial lines—particularly between whites and 
blacks, but in the West, also between whites and Asians or Native 
Americans—were first erected in the eighteenth century and proliferated 
 
 *  Charles A. Dana Professor of Philosophy, Colby College, Waterville, Maine. 
 1. Nancy F. Cott, Giving Character to Our Whole Civil Polity: Marriage and the 
Public Order in the Late Nineteenth Century, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN’S HISTORY: 
NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS 111 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995). 
 2. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 35 
(2000). 
 3. Cott, supra note 1, at 107, 111.   
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after abolition.4  Forty-one states barred interracial marriages at some 
point in their history.5  These antimiscegenation laws were finally 
invalidated in 1967 in the Supreme Court case of Loving v. Virginia.6 
Bars to polygamous marriages were targeted at the Mormon practice 
of plural marriage in the Utah territory, and were first erected under the 
Morrill Act of 1862 that made bigamy a federal offense.7  Shortly 
thereafter, the federal government further penalized polygamists by 
making cohabitation an offense, by taking away Utah women’s right to 
vote, by making the affirmation that one is not a polygamist a condition 
of voter registration for men, by denying polygamists the right to serve 
in public office or on juries, by requiring women in polygamous 
marriages to testify against their husbands in court, and ultimately by 
seizing the assets of the Mormon church.8  In addition, in the nineteenth 
century, every state made bigamy a crime.9  The constitutionality of this 
marriage bar was challenged on First Amendment freedom of religion 
grounds in 1878, in Reynolds v. United States.10  In said case, the 
Supreme Court upheld the bar on polygamy,11 and that ruling still stands 
today. 
Legal bars to same-sex marriage are of substantially more recent 
vintage, having largely arisen within the last decade.  Bars to same-sex 
marriage began to proliferate at both the state and federal level only after 
same-sex couples began suing in court for the right to marry under 
marriage laws that did not specify the gender of the spouses.12  As of 
November 2004, thirty-eight states explicitly defined marriage as 
between one man and one woman, and seventeen had incorporated those 
definitions into their constitutions.13  The 1996 Defense of Marriage Act 
defined marriage for federal purposes as between one man and one 
woman.14  It also qualified the Full Faith and Credit Clause, relieving 
states of the requirement to recognize marriages legally performed in 
 
 4. COTT, supra note 2, at 99; Cott, supra note 1, at 118–19. 
 5. Cott, supra note 1, at 118. 
 6. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 2 (1967). 
 7. COTT, supra note 2, at 112. 
 8. Cott, supra note 1, at 118–19; Nancy Rosenblum, Democratic Sex: Reynolds v. 
U.S., Sexual Relations, and Community, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON 
LAW AND NATURE 76–77 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997). 
 9. COTT, supra note 2, at 112. 
 10. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
 11. Id. at 166, 168. 
 12. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge, The Question of Marriage, in HOMOSEXUALITY 
AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 200, 204–08 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 1999). 
 13. National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Marriage Map, http://www.thetaskforce. 
org/community/marriagecenter.cfm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). 
 14. Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996). 
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another state.15  More recently, some have advocated a Federal Marriage 
Amendment that would make the monogamous heterosexual nature of 
marriage a matter of constitutional definition.16 
What the law recognizes as civil marriage has not, however, been 
determinative of how citizens understand the social institution of 
marriage.  Slaves did marry without legal sanction.17  Nineteenth-century 
members of the Latter-day Saints (LDS) protested the federal regulation 
of polygamy by continuing to practice plural marriage, either openly or 
underground;18 and today members of some fundamentalist offshoots of 
Mormonism practice polygamy in the absence of state recognition of 
their marriages.19  Antimiscegenation laws did not prevent interracial 
couples from constructing lives together, nor do same-sex marriage bars 
prevent gays and lesbians from publicly celebrating their unions, or 
religious communities from recognizing them. 
The central issue raised by marriage bars is thus not whether the state 
should permit nonmonogamous and nonheterosexual marriages, but 
whether the state should support nonmonogamous and nonheterosexual 
marriages by assigning them the legal status of civil marriage.20  With 
the legal status of civil marriage comes immigration rights, the right not 
to testify against one’s spouse, social security survivor’s benefits, 
inheritance without a will, and the right to give proxy consent. With the 
status of civil marriage also comes coverage under divorce laws and thus 
legal determination of property distribution, alimony payment, and child 
custody and support. Informally, having the status of civil marriage can 
also mean access to such benefits as a partner’s health insurance plan, 
reduced membership fees for the spouse, and access to family rates. 
Given that neither the polygamous marriages of some citizens nor the 
same-sex marriages of others are currently recognized by the state, one 
 
 15. Id. § 2. 
 16. The nineteenth-century antipolygamy campaign also produced (unsuccessful) 
demands for a constitutional amendment that would settle, with finality, the nation’s 
commitment to heterosexual monogamy as its sole marriage form. 
 17. COTT, supra note 2, at 34–35. 
 18. JESSIE L. EMBRY, MORMON POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES: LIFE IN THE PRINCIPLE, 17–27 
(1987); IRWIN ALTMAN & JOSEPH GINAT, POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETY 43–44 (1996). 
 19. See generally ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 18. 
 20. This requires some qualification.  Because cohabitation was made an 
offense—sometimes a felony offense, as in the 1935 Utah law—polygamy ended up not 
only being not supported in the law but coercively prohibited. IRWIN & GINAT, supra 
note 18, at 46. 
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might have expected that advocates of same-sex marriage rights would 
make common cause with advocates of polygamous marriage rights.  
That has not been the case.  With few exceptions, advocates of same-sex 
marriage have exercised a vigorous silence about the other marriage bar 
currently in effect, namely the bar to polygamy.21  There are two main 
reasons for that silence.  Opponents of same-sex marriage often invoke 
polygamy in order to make reductio arguments against expanding the 
definition of marriage to include same-sex couples: If the definition of 
marriage is treated as something that is not fixed, then what, they ask, is 
to prevent the definition of marriage from being expanded to include not 
only same-sex marriages, but also polygamous marriages (and incestuous 
marriages and marriages with animals, etc.)? In this way, social hostility 
to polygamy is invoked as a reason not to permit same-sex marriage.  
Thus, advocates of same-sex marriage have found it strategically unwise 
to press an analogy between the bars to same-sex and polygamous 
marriage. 
The political expediency of not associating same-sex marriage with 
polygamous marriage explains the silence of those at the front of the 
political fray.  It does not fully explain why academic philosophers and 
legal theorists have maintained a similar silence about the “other” 
marriage bar.  The principle reason appears to be a conviction that same-sex 
marriages and polygamous marriages are substantially disanalogous.  While 
same-sex marriages challenge the traditional gender structure of 
marriage, polygamy is more likely to exaggerate the gender hierarchy 
within marriage and is thus incompatible with a liberal democracy that 
values women’s equality.  Same-sex marriage advocates thus routinely 
dismiss the issue of polygamous marriage as irrelevant to the question of 
whether the bar to same-sex marriage should be lifted.  In particular, 
they insist that polygamous marriages are sufficiently socially dangerous 
that extending marriage rights to same-sex couples will not put us on a 
slippery slope toward recognizing polygamous marriages.22 
Despite all this, the refusal to regard the marriage bar to polygamy as 
a significant political issue bears closer scrutiny.  In what follows, this 
Article will be arguing that more careful attention to the historical 
practice of polygamy strengthens the case for same-sex marriage; and 
attention to the similarities between the social issues at stake in the 
 
 21. But see GORDON ALBERT BABST, LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, MARRIAGE, 
AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A CONTEMPORARY CASE FOR DIS-ESTABLISHMENT 87–89 
(2002) (arguing that there is a critical legal analogy between the bars to same-sex, 
interracial, and polygamous marriage insofar as legal reasoning in all three cases appeals 
to alleged Christian values and views of divine purpose). 
 22. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM 
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 148–49 (1996). 
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antipolygamy campaign and the same-sex marriage campaign can 
productively complicate our sense of what the fundamental issues are in 
the same-sex marriage debate.  Finally, this Article will suggest that it is 
not altogether clear that legal recognition of polygamous marriage is 
incompatible with a liberal, democratic, and egalitarian society.  The 
proper response to same-sex marriage opponents’ reductio argument may 
instead be, “And indeed, why not also polygamy?”23 
II.  COUNTERING APPEALS TO A MARRIAGE TRADITION 
So let us turn first to the ways that more explicit attention to polygamy 
might help to build a stronger case for same-sex marriage.  The same-sex 
marriage debate is a debate between expansionists, who argue that the 
traditional conception of marriage enshrined in law should be expanded to 
include same-sex couples, and traditionalists, who insist on the value of 
preserving the traditional conception of marriage as between one man 
and one woman.  Traditionalists argue that citizens will find laws and 
public policies reasonable only if they are consistent with citizens’ core 
values.24  It is thus always relevant for the law to take into account “our” 
particular moral traditions and to be extremely cautious of legal 
innovations that might undermine core social values.  In assessing the 
desirability of extending civil marriage to same-sex couples, traditionalists 
point out that it is particularly important to bear in mind the two 
thousand-year-old tradition of understanding marriage as the union of 
one man and one woman, a tradition that includes Judeo-Christian, 
Western European, and American cultural histories.25  Given the 
extraordinary importance attached to heterosexual marriage and the 
absence of any comparable tradition of recognizing same-sex unions, 
traditionalists conclude that the state ought not expand the current legal 
definition of marriage. 
One way of challenging the traditionalist’s argument is to challenge 
the propriety of premising our laws on the majority’s moral or religious 
values, no matter how longstanding, given the fact that ours is a liberal 
democracy designed to protect individuals’ liberty to pursue a plurality 
of ways of life.  Another way of challenging the traditionalists’ argument 
 
 23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 24. CARLOS A. BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS: AN EXPLORATION IN 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 139–45 (2003). 
 25. John Witte, Jr., The Tradition of Traditional Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND 
SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 47–49 (Lynn D. Wardle et al. eds., 2003). 
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is to challenge the truth of their claims about the Judeo-Christian marriage 
tradition.  In this vein, one option is to observe that there has been at 
least a minor thread within the Judeo-Christian tradition of acknowledging 
same-sex unions. John Boswell’s rediscovery of the union ceremonies 
for monks performed by the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages 
is by now well known.26  In the 1800s, so-called Boston marriages 
between two women emerged as a recognized cultural phenomenon in 
the U.S. which was not, at the time, regarded as incompatible with a 
Judeo-Christian tradition.27  Finally, at present, a variety of religious 
denominations, including Unitarians, the United Church of Christ, 
Reform Judaism, the Society of Friends, and Episcopalians recognize 
same-sex unions.28 
These facts, however, are unlikely to move traditionalists given that 
most of the evidence is from very recent developments within Christian 
and Jewish communities; and those religious communities are doing 
exactly what traditionalists object to the law doing—adopting policies 
that fly in the face of a millennia-old tradition of heterosexual 
monogamous marriage.29 
A more powerful challenge might be framed by inviting traditionalists 
to consider whether the Judeo-Christian tradition will support both of the 
marriage bars they wish to sustain: the bar to same-sex marriage and the 
bar to polygamy.  If it will not, then the Judeo-Christian “tradition” may 
be a dangerous tool for same-sex marriage opponents to invoke. 
Polygamy has, in fact, a lengthy history within the Judeo-Christian 
tradition—beginning with the polygamous marriages of the Old 
Testament patriarchs.30  Nowhere in either the Hebrew Bible or the New 
Testament is polygamy forbidden.31 Indeed, some European Jews 
practiced polygamy until the eleventh century; and even then the ban on 
polygamy was adopted only to avoid Christian persecution in France and 
Germany.  Martin Luther, while not endorsing polygamy as an ideal or 
pervasive practice, nevertheless observed that polygamy does not 
contradict the Scripture and so cannot be prohibited by Christianity.32  
 
 26. JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 218–21 (1994). 
 27. LILLIAN FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOVE OF MEN: ROMANTIC FRIENDSHIP 
AND LOVE BETWEEN WOMEN FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT 16, 190, 208–13 
(1981). 
 28. BABST, supra note 21, at 83 n.14. 
 29. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 30. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 18, at 41–42; PHILIP L. KILBRIDE, PLURAL 
MARRIAGE FOR OUR TIMES: A REINVENTED OPTION? 59–66 (1994). 
 31. EMBRY, supra note 18, at 4–5. But note 1 Timothy 3:2,12, where “overseers” 
and “deacons” in the church are to be “husband of but one wife” (personal 
correspondence, Steve Palmquist). 
 32. I confess, indeed, I cannot forbid anyone who wishes to marry several wives,  
nor is that against Holy Scripture; however, I do not want that custom 
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And within Catholicism, the question of whether polygamy was 
acceptable in exceptional circumstances was not finally settled until the 
Council of Trent in 1563.33 
Polygamy has had an especially significant place in U.S. social life 
after Joseph Smith’s 1843 revelation that members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (the LDS church) should begin 
practicing what they called “plural marriages” patterned on Old 
Testament patriarchal polygamy.  The LDS church was an enormously 
powerful religious community in the nineteenth century.  Occupying the 
Utah territory, the Church planned to expand into a territory that 
included parts of California, Oregon, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, 
Wyoming, and all of Nevada and Utah.34  The Church set up its own 
legal system, including legally recognizing plural marriages and granting 
divorces and property settlements.35  The political and economic power 
of the Mormon Church made credible its aim to break away from the 
United States and motivated a series of federal acts designed to rein in 
the Utah territory, including the disenfranchisement of polygamists and 
seizure of the Church’s finances.36  Under this federal pressure, the LDS 
church formally repudiated plural marriage in 1890, but fundamentalist 
offshoots continue to practice plural marriage today.37  One study 
estimates membership at twenty to fifty thousand.38 
In short, polygamous marriage cannot be dismissed as a negligible blip in 
an otherwise consistent tradition of heterosexual monogamous marriage.  
On the contrary, polygamy is very much part of a millenias-long pluralist 
 
introduced among Christians among whom it is proper to pass up even 
things that are permissible, to avoid scandal and to live respectably, which 
Paul everywhere enjoins.  
KILBRIDE, supra note 30, at 63 (quoting Luther’s correspondence). 
 33. Id. at 64. 
 34. Rosenblum, supra note 8, at 72–73. 
 35. Brigham Young issued 1645 divorces during his presidency of the Church.  
JOAN SMYTH IVERSEN, THE ANTIPOLYGAMY CONTROVERSY IN U.S. WOMEN’S 
MOVEMENTS, 1880–1925: A DEBATE ON THE AMERICAN HOME 59 (1997). 
 36. President Hayes observed that “[l]aws must be enacted which will take from 
the Mormon Church its temporal power. Mormonism as a sectarian idea is nothing, but 
as a system of government it is our duty to deal with it as an enemy of our institutions 
and its supporters and leaders as criminals.” Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 75 (quoting 
Hayes). 
 37. See ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 18.  Two prominent religious communities 
that accept the principle of “plural marriage” are located in Hildale, Utah and Colorado 
City, Arizona.  Id. at 50–51. 
 38. Id. at 2.   
CALHOUN.DOC 8/7/2019  12:41 PM 
 
1030 
Judeo-Christian tradition of marriage.39  Traditionalists thus enter quite 
perilous territory when they invoke the Judeo-Christian tradition as a 
reason for rejecting same-sex civil marriage.  The same tradition that 
traditionalists believe justifies limiting civil marriage to heterosexual 
relationships, would also justify extending civil marriage to polygamous 
relationships.  Such an implication is likely to seriously undermine the 
appeal, for traditionalists, of using tradition as a guide to marriage 
policy.  Moreover, given how pervasive appeals to tradition are in the 
same-sex marriage debate, marriage rights advocates stand to gain 
quite a lot by reminding those who would appeal to tradition that it 
does not support state and federal definitions of marriage as not only 
heterosexual, but between one man and one woman. 
III.  FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STATE FORM OF MARRIAGE 
More importantly, attending to the details of the nineteenth-century 
polygamy debate throws into relief the larger issues—both social and 
legal—that are at stake when marriage bars are erected and subsequently 
challenged.  Neither the polygamy debates of the nineteenth century nor 
the same-sex marriage debates of today were just about a minority 
sexual practice.  They were also debates about how to respond to the 
failure of heterosexual monogamous marriage to deliver the social 
benefits that warrant the state’s legally recognizing these marriages in 
the first place.  Should heterosexual monogamy as a marital form be 
protected?  Or should alternative marital forms be granted social and 
legal standing?  Both plural marriage advocates and same-sex marriage 
advocates argued that state support should instead be given to a different 
definition of marriage—polygamous or gender-neutral. 
Rising divorce rates in both the late nineteenth and late twentieth 
centuries40 called into question the cultural ideal of a marriage as what 
Karen Struening has called a “multipurpose association.”41  Marriages 
are supposed to satisfy a plurality of individuals’ needs, including needs 
for sexual and emotional intimacy, reproduction, childrearing, and the 
care of adults’ material needs.  The expectation that marriages will meet 
individuals’ sexual and emotional needs encourages individuals to 
dissolve their marriages when those needs are not met, and to search for 
 
 39. It is important to bear in mind that our U.S. tradition occurs within a 
multination state whose traditions include those of Indian nations for whom monogamy 
was not always the defining form of marriage and which sometimes recognized unions 
between same-sexed persons. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 27–30; COTT, supra note 
2, at 25. 
 40. IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 106–07; COTT, supra note 2, at 105–07, 203. 
 41. KAREN STRUENING, NEW FAMILY VALUES: LIBERTY, EQUALITY, DIVERSITY 85 
(2002). 
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new partners42—hence liberalization of divorce law and a rise in the 
divorce rate in both periods. The failure of many marriages to endure, 
however, is at odds with the expectation that marriages will provide 
stable contexts for the rearing of children and the economic support of 
adults—expectations that require long-term commitment to staying in 
the marriage. 
In the nineteenth century, the polygamy debates centered on the 
question of what the best social response should be to the failure of 
conventional marriage to serve as a “multipurpose association.” Moral 
reform movements assumed that the problem had more to do with the 
individuals within marriages than with the form of marriage itself.43  
Moral reformers thus argued that conventional marriage should remain 
the normative form of marriage but be shored up with social reform and 
legal regulation.  They focused energy on curbing male lust, eliminating 
prostitution, and reducing the number of unwed mothers.  Controlling 
the rate of divorce was also linked in the public’s imagination to 
controlling the Mormon practice of polygamy, because relatively liberal 
divorce laws were condemned for permitting “serial polygamy” under 
conventional marriage.44  Many called for legal steps to be taken to 
check both serial polygamy and Mormon plural marriage.45  As a result, 
the demand for federal control of Mormon polygamy was conjoined to a 
request for a federal marriage law that would control the rate of divorce 
within monogamous marriage.46 
On the other side, polygamy advocates argued that an alternative 
marital form was more likely to meet with success.  Mormon women, for 
example, argued that plural marriage promised to solve the social 
problems created by the failure of monogamous companionate marriage 
to supply both adequate sexual satisfaction for men and a stable 
reproductive environment for women and children.47  Sharing their 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Julie Dunfey, ‘Living the Principle’ of Plural Marriage: Mormon Women, 
Utopia, and Female Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century, 10 FEMINIST STUDIES 523, 527 
(1984). 
 44. Rosenblum, supra note 8, at 75.  According to Joan Iversen, social critics 
charged divorce rates in New England with creating “polygamy in New England.” 
IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 106. 
 45. IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 107. 
 46. Id. at 106–07, 219–20. 
 47. For example, the Utah women’s journal, The Women’s Exponent, “cited stories 
of infanticide, alcoholic and abusive husbands, desertion, divorce, and prostitution as 
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monogamous sisters’ assumption that a large part of the problem was 
due to men’s higher sex drive, Mormon women argued that if only men 
were allowed to have plural wives, they would not be motivated to use 
prostitutes (or presumably, to divorce), and thus fewer women would be 
degraded by work as prostitutes and fewer would suffer the hardships of 
bearing children out of wedlock or of being left without adequate 
economic support.48  Moreover, given the scarcity of “worthy men” 
and the surfeit of “pure women,” plural marriage would guarantee 
that no woman who wished to be married would have to marry 
beneath herself.49 
Twentieth-century debates over same-sex marriage have been very 
much about the same question of what to do about conventional 
marriage’s failure to serve all its intended purposes.  Opponents of 
same-sex marriage see same-sex marriage as the last straw in a larger 
social process of decaying social commitment to committed, long-term, 
sexually faithful, monogamous relationships and as the culmination of a 
social shift toward basing relationships purely on self-indulgent personal 
preferences. The social consequence of this collapse of conventional 
marriage is a more than fifty percent divorce rate,50 a reduction in the 
percentage of adults who are married,51 the escalation of female-headed 
households, and the growing number of children born to never-married 
women.52  These trends are also blamed for putting pressure on the 
welfare system and producing a generation of children who have failed 
to internalize values of loyalty, commitment, and self-restraint.53  Legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage, on this view, is objectionable not so 
much because it is same-sex, but because same-sex marriage symbolizes 
a kind of last straw in the social assault on the traditional conception of 
marriage. 
Thus, in the twenty-first-century marriage debate, as in the 
nineteenth-century marriage debate, one side argues that conventional 
marriage should remain the normative form of marriage but be shored 
up with social and legal reforms.  Proposed reforms today include 
conducting abstinence education in schools, reducing payments to 
unwed welfare mothers, reintroducing fault-based divorce, and 
improving tax breaks for married couples. Protecting the social status of 
 
evidence of the corruption of the larger society.” Dunfey, supra note 43, at 527–28; see 
also IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 63. 
 48. Dunfey, supra note 43, at 528, 530. 
 49. Id. at 523–26, 528–29. 
 50. COTT, supra note 2, at 203. 
 51. The percentage of adults who are married dropped from 75% in the early 
1970s to 56% in the late 1990s.  Id. at 203. 
 52. Id. at 204. 
 53. Id. 
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marriage as a unique and sacred institution by withholding legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage becomes part of this “shoring up” 
strategy. 
The other side argues that alternative marital and family forms are 
more likely to meet with success—especially if they do not burden a 
single relationship with meeting the full range of individuals’ sexual, 
emotional, reproductive, childrearing and material needs.  For example, 
the growing practice of parenting outside of a marriage—whether as 
a result of divorce or of not marrying in the first place—detaches 
reproductive and childrearing relationships from sex and romantic love.  
The caretaking networks that emerged in response to the AIDS epidemic 
similarly detached adult caretaking relationships from those that satisfy 
sexual and romantic needs. Advocacy of same-sex marriage becomes 
part of this splitting off of the romantic and sexual from the reproductive 
and caretaking functions of conventional marriage.  This is not to say 
that those joined via same-sex unions do not produce and rear children.  
It is to say that the advocacy of same-sex marriage rights has primarily 
invoked the importance of individuals being able to satisfy their 
romantic, companionate, and sexual needs. 
In short, both the latter half of the nineteenth century and the past 
decade have been important moments in our collective social life for 
thinking about what sorts of relationships might best satisfy individuals’ 
complex needs for emotional and sexual intimacy, procreation, childrearing, 
and adult care-taking—and for reflecting on the ways that the state 
should, and should not, be involved in protecting those relationships.  
Perhaps most crucially, these historical moments also presented the 
opportunity to take up fundamental political questions concerning 
marriage: Should there be a state supported form of marriage?  If so, 
should there be more than one state supported form of marriage?  Or 
should the state simply enforce whatever contracts into which individuals 
voluntarily enter? 
Because civil marriage has always been an uneasy merging of a public 
status with a private contract, it is appropriate to ask these fundamental 
questions about whether and how the state should be involved in 
marriages.54  Civil marriages are contracts insofar as they are entered 
into only by voluntary consent.  Civil marriage is a public status insofar 
 
 54. See id. at 11, 101–02, and BABST, supra note 21, at 16–21, for discussions of 
the contract and status features of civil marriage. 
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as individuals are not free to determine the terms of the marital 
contract—who may enter a marriage, what obligations spouses have, or 
the terms for dissolving a marriage.  These features are all set by the 
state. 
The contract and status aspects of civil marriage pull against each 
other.55  To the extent that we think of civil marriage as a private 
contract, voluntarily entered into for the purpose of satisfying some 
combination of the individual’s particular sexual, emotional, caretaking, 
and reproductive needs, we are inevitably pulled toward the idea that if 
there is freedom of contract, then we should have the freedom to devise 
whatever marriage contract with whatever partner or partners we please 
and to determine the conditions of dissolution of the marriage.56  This, 
one might think, is as things should be in a liberal society that permits 
citizens to pursue their own conception of the good so long as doing so 
does not infringe on others’ rights, even if that conception is a minority 
or unpopular one.  From the viewpoint of liberal theory, the state should 
remain neutral with respect to competing conceptions of what marriage 
is and of how individuals’ needs for sex and emotional intimacy, 
material support in daily life, reproduction, and childrearing are to be 
met.  The state fails to be neutral when it chooses one particular form of 
relationship to support.  If we focus on the contractual, consent-based 
nature of marriage, the central question is: “What legal protections and 
supports, if any, should the state provide for the plurality of purposes 
that individuals might have for entering into marital contracts?” 
On the other hand, to the extent that we think of marriage as a public 
status, like citizenship or eligibility for public office, we move in the 
direction of a less pluralistic definition of civil marriage.  We think of 
civil marriage not as something that individuals define for themselves, 
but as a relationship that the state defines for all of us: civil marriage is 
state marriage.  On this view, it is not up to individuals, with their varied 
preferences and values, to determine what will qualify as the state’s form 
of marriage.  Instead, the state must accept or reject the various 
candidates for the state’s form of marriage—monogamous, polygamous, 
heterosexual, same-sex—according to whether those relationships are 
believed to contribute to the social good, not the individual’s private 
 
 55. Nancy Rosenblum pursues this tension as it manifests itself in liberal 
democratic thought.  On the one hand, a privacy model of marriage pulls in a libertarian 
direction; on the other hand, the view that marriages and families are first schools of 
justice pulls in the direction of a more restrictive conception of marriage.  Rosenblum, 
supra note 8, at 80–81. 
 56. See generally Will Kymlicka, Rethinking the Family, 20 PHILOSOPHY AND 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 77 (1991) (reviewing SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE 
FAMILY (1989)), for an elaboration of this contractual view. 
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good.  That social good may be the cultivation in adults of key social 
virtues such as self-sacrifice, loyalty, and sexual self-restraint.  Or it may 
be the training of adults and children in democratic virtues of equal 
respect.  Or it may be the preservation of a foundational social tradition, 
such as the Judeo-Christian tradition of marriage.  Monogamous, 
polygamous, heterosexual, and same-sex relationships then get evaluated 
and accepted or rejected as candidates for the state’s form of marriage 
according to whether those relationships are believed to contribute to the 
social good.  For example, Justice Waite, who rendered the Court’s 
opinion in Reynolds,57 assumed a status conception of marriage when he 
affirmed that “it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every 
civil government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be 
the law of social life under its dominion.”58  He rejected polygamy as the 
law of social life on the grounds that it is more allied with despotism 
than democracy and thus is contrary to the social good. 
Civil marriage’s peculiar hybridization of private contract and public 
status means that social campaigns to revise the terms of civil 
marriage—by liberalizing divorce laws, offering an option of covenant 
marriage, or extending marriage rights to formerly excluded individuals—are 
often ambiguous between two claims.  On the one hand, revisionist 
campaigns might be viewed as pressing the state toward a more 
genuinely contractual and pluralist conception of marriage.  These campaigns 
might aim to disestablish a state form of marriage in order to afford 
individuals greater liberty to pursue their own conceptions of the good.59  
On the other hand, one might see revisionist campaigns as pressing the 
state toward simply a different status conception of civil marriage. 
What is striking about the pro-polygamy and pro-same-sex marriage 
campaigns is that neither campaign was committed to fully pluralizing 
marital and familial forms by insisting that the law be neutral with 
respect to competing conceptions of how people can best satisfy their 
needs for emotional and sexual intimacy, care-taking, reproduction, and 
childrearing. Instead the debate focused on which one of rivaling legal 
definitions of marriage—monogamy or polygamy, monogamous 
 
 57. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 153 (1878). 
 58. Id. at 166. 
 59. Nancy F. Cott argues that an array of changes in marriage and divorce law as 
well as the nonprosecution of Mormon fundamentalist polygamy indicate the 
disestablishment of (a single form of) marriage.  COTT, supra note 2, at 200–15. 
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heterosexual or monogamous gender-neutral marriage—should define 
the state’s marital form. 
In the nineteenth century, polygamy advocates pursued the recognition 
of plural marriage as the state’s marital form.  Monogamous marriage 
had failed adequately to deliver the goods it purported to produce—to 
combine romantic love with a stable context for childrearing, to regulate 
male sexuality, and to provide women with adequate economic support 
and children with fathers.  Polygamy was being offered up by the LDS 
church not just as their preferred marriage form given their particular 
religious beliefs, but as the marriage form that would best secure the 
social goods with which a state should concern itself.  Justice Waite, in 
his Reynolds opinion, was exactly right to see that the question at issue 
was which form of marriage—monogamy or polygamy—was to be the 
state’s marriage.60 
In recent decades, same-sex marriage advocates have pursued 
recognition of non-gender-specific monogamy not just as their preferred 
marriage form but as the state’s marital form. Heterosexual marriage 
has failed to prove that it can uniquely deliver important goods such 
as long-term commitment and satisfaction of individuals’ needs for 
emotional intimacy.  Unlike polygamy advocates, same-sex marriage 
advocates may not be able to argue that same-sex marriages are more 
likely to deliver the goods—with the one possible exception of gender 
equality within marriage—but advocates are positioned to argue that 
same-sex marriages would do at least as well as the currently flagging 
institution of heterosexual marriage.  Thus, the state form of marriage 
should be redefined in gender-neutral terms.  What is to be retained, 
however, is the existence of a singular definition of marriage, which, 
while gender-neutral, still presumes the monogamous and companionate 
form of conventional marriage.  Thus, marriage rights advocates are 
often quick in the face of the challenge, “And what about polygamy?” to 
affirm their resistance to any more wide-ranging reform of marriage.61  
As Judith Butler notes, with some disenchantment, the same-sex 
marriage debate is not just a debate over whose relationship will be 
legitimated and supported by the state, but also over whose desire will 
become the state’s desire.62 
In short, despite their apparent radicalism, both the pro-polygamy and 
pro-same-sex marriage campaigns have been marked by an antipluralist 
and exclusionary conception of marriage.  Neither debate seized the 
 
 60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 61. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 148–49. 
 62. Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, 13 DIFFERENCES: A 
JOURNAL OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUDIES 14, 22 (2002). 
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opportunity to question the desirability of defining a single form of state 
marriage.  Both simply assumed that the state should support marriage 
and only one form of marriage.  However, maintaining a single state 
definition of marriage is at odds with the fundamental premises of a 
liberal political society, with the private, contractual aspect of marriage, 
and with satisfying individuals’ multiple relational needs.  Thus, the state 
would do better to move toward a more pluralistic conception of personal 
relationships; and it might do so in one of two ways.  On the one hand, we 
might adopt a fully contractual approach to emotional, sexual, childrearing, 
and adult support relationships.63  In that case, the state would simply 
enforce the terms of the contracts agreed upon by the contracting parties.  
On the other hand, the state might remain in the business of licensing 
marriages or other relational forms.  But in a pluralist liberal society, one 
would expect that there would be a plurality of marriage or relational 
options rather than a single state form of marriage.  The U.S. is in fact 
moving in the direction of creating various packages of rights designed 
to protect and support a plurality of relational choices.  On offer already 
are domestic partnerships (California, New Jersey), heterosexual civil 
marriage, same-sex civil unions (Vermont, Connecticut), same-sex marriage 
(Massachusetts), and covenant marriage (Arkansas, Arizona, Louisiana).64  
Same-sex marriage advocacy loses much of its radical (and plain old 
liberal) potential by refusing to take up the banner of disestablishing a 
single state form of marriage.  Disestablishing a single state form of 
marriage would in turn, of course, open the doors to state recognition of 
polygamous marriages. 
IV.  WHO’S AFRAID OF POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE: POLYGAMY AND 
GENDER EQUALITY 
Up to this point in our discussion, polygamous marriage has remained 
safely in the past.  If the state is to support the plurality of individuals’ 
relational choices, and if one significant relational choice is of plural 
spouses, then the question of polygamy must be confronted. 
Why not polygamy?  John Stuart Mill famously asserted in On Liberty 
that polygamy was “a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the 
 
 63. See generally Kymlicka, supra note 56. 
 64. See, e.g., 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves H. 847, § 3 (codified as amended at VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2002)), 2005 Conn. Acts 05-10 (Reg. Sess.) (effective Oct. 1, 
2005).   
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community [namely women], and an emancipation of the other from 
reciprocity of obligation towards them.”65  Antipolygamists of the 
nineteenth century likened husband and wives in a plural marriage to 
slave master and enslaved subject.66  New England women’s rights 
advocates of that century regarded polygamous marriages as no better 
than Turkish harems, a practice designed to serve male lust without 
women’s willing consent.67 
In marked contrast to this view, the feminist historians Joan Smyth Iversen 
and Julie Dunfey both offer persuasive evidence that nineteenth-century 
plural marriage was not a uniquely gender-inegalitarian form of marriage.68  
The Mormon women’s rights advocates at the time argued, with good 
reason, that plural wives were in fact more liberated than their New 
England counterparts. In terms of educational and economic opportunities, 
civil and political rights, and autonomy within marriage, they rated quite 
well in comparison to New England women in monogamous 
marriages.69  Each plural wife lived in her own house, functioning as the 
head of household and relying on her own judgment while her husband 
was away on Church missions or staying with other wives.70  Married 
Mormon women had the right to own property and sometimes owned 
their homesteads.71  Plural marriage was designed to free wives from 
some of the evils of male lust—protecting them against diseases that 
might be brought home from visits to prostitutes and freeing pregnant 
women from marital sexual duties.72  Mormon wives were substantially 
more involved in economically contributing to their families than were 
their eastern counterparts, because their economic contribution was 
critical to both frontier society and their own support.73  They were 
among the first women to vote in the United States,74 and half the first 
enrollees in the University of Deseret (now the University of Utah) were 
women.75  They entered plural marriages as well-educated women raised 
 
 65. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL: 
ETHICAL, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS 291–92 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1961) (1863). 
 66. IVERSEN, supra note 35, 134–35; SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON 
QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 47–49 (2002). 
 67. IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 142–44. 
 68. Dunfey, supra note 43; see also Joan Iversen, Feminist Implications of 
Mormon Polygyny, 10 FEMINIST STUDIES 505–22 (1984); see also IVERSEN, supra note 
35, at 53–75. 
 69. Iversen, supra note 68 at 510–11, 513. 
 70. Id. at 513–14. 
 71. Id. at 511. 
 72. Dunfey, supra note 43, at 528, 530, 531; Iversen, supra note 68, at 509. 
 73. Iversen, supra note 68, at 511; Rosenblum, supra note 8, at 79. 
 74. Iversen, supra note 68 at 505. 
 75. IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 55. 
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originally with the expectation of monogamous marriage.76  They were 
able to exit marriage through divorce, and seventy-three percent of 
divorce actions in Utah territory were by women.77 
What these historical details remind us is that gender inequality is a 
contingent, not a conceptual, feature of polygamy.  Whether or not 
polygamy is strongly connected to women’s inequality depends on at 
least three sets of factors.  First are the background social conditions that 
affect women’s overall level of opportunity and self-determination.  Do 
women have basic civil and political rights including freedom to travel 
and the right to own property?  Do they have access to education?  
Do they have the means to be economically self-supporting?  Is there 
readily available information about, and access to, alternative 
ways of life?  Such background conditions affect women’s level of 
genuine freedom of choice to enter into polygamous relationships as 
well as women’s status within those relationships.  One reason why 
Mormon women were able to mount a plausible defense of plural 
marriage—in spite of the patriarchal ideological underpinnings of plural 
marriage—was because their background conditions were favorable to 
women’s autonomy. 
Second, whether or not polygamy is strongly connected to women’s 
inequality depends on the form that the social practice of polygamy 
takes.  By whom are plural spouses selected and courted?  Whose consent is 
presumed necessary?  Who is presumed to have decisionmaking authority 
(and over what) within the marriage?  How do participants understand 
their duties as a spouse?  Is polygamy practiced only by heterosexuals 
and only as polygyny?78  Or do lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals also 
practice polygamy as well as heterosexual women in polyandrous 
relationships?79  The customary social practices associated with polygamy 
help determine the degree of gender equality, mutuality, and individual 
autonomy versus unilateral dominance and gender inequality that is 
likely to occur in actual polygamous marriages.  As Nancy Rosenblum 
observes, “There is no reason why egalitarian norms of property 
distribution, parenting, and the division of domestic and market labor 
 
 76. Dunfey, supra note 43, at 529, 524. 
 77. IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 60. 
 78. Polygyny is defined as “[t]he condition or practice of having more than one 
wife at the same time.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004). 
 79. Polyandry is defined as “[t]he condition or practice of having more than one 
husband at the same time.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (8th ed. 2004). 
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recommended by democratic theorists could not be adjusted for plural 
marriage.”80 
Finally, whether or not polygamy facilitates gender inequality depends 
critically on the legal form it takes.  To whom is polygamous civil 
marriage available?  Same-sex groups?  One woman with multiple men?  
Two women and two men?  In a liberal political society governed by 
norms of gender equality, polygamous civil marriage could not be 
legally equated with polygyny,81 but would have to permit a variety of 
gender configurations.  In a society that recognizes same-sex marriages, 
polygamy would necessarily extend to all-male or all-female polygamous 
marriages.  Moreover, if the idea that there is a single “head of household” 
is not operative in legal conceptions of monogamous marriage, it would 
be inconsistent to introduce that assumption into a legal conception of 
polygamous marriage.  Of equal importance is the question, from whom 
is consent required?  Liberal societies would not tolerate a form of civil 
marriage which did not assign equal importance to the consent of all 
spouses, and which did not offer the exit option of divorce to all spouses.  
What rules govern divorce and property distribution?  In a liberal society 
that grants no-fault divorces to monogamous marriages, exit from 
polygamous marriages would likewise have to be on a no-fault basis.  In 
short, the legal form of polygamous marriage determines the extent to 
which assumptions about gender relations and sexual orientation are 
encoded into marriage law.  It also determines the level of required 
formal consent for entrance into marriage and the availability of exit 
options for disaffected spouses. 
The quick dismissal of polygamy on grounds that it, unlike monogamy, is 
distinctively gender-inegalitarian is the result of smuggling in a set of 
unstated assumptions about the background social conditions for women, 
the social practice of polygamy, and its likely legal form that would 
render it inegalitarian, but that are implausible assumptions about plural 
marriage in a liberal egalitarian democracy. 
Opponents might object that, in fact, polygamy, as it is practiced 
worldwide, tends to take forms that are oppressive to women.  Permitting 
polygamous civil marriage would thus open the doors to illiberal ethnic 
groups in the United States practicing social forms of polygamy that are 
oppressive to women.  Two responses to this objection bear noting.  
First, unless we are willing to also eliminate monogamous civil marriage 
because it, too, sometimes takes social forms that are oppressive to women, 
targeting polygamy for a special bar would involve the state in a clear 
failure to exercise neutrality with respect to alternative conceptions of 
 
 80. Rosenblum, supra note 8, at 81. 
 81. See supra note 78 for a definition of polygyny. 
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the good.  Indeed, Justice Waite’s reason for rejecting polygamy in 
Reynolds was driven in part by hostility to non-European cultures.82  
“Polygamy,” he noted, “has always been odious among the northern and 
western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon 
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of 
African people.”83  Subsequent Supreme Court Justices rejected polygamy 
out of hostility to non-Christian ways of life: “Bigamy and polygamy are 
crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries,”84 and 
polygamy is “a return to barbarism[;] [i]t is contrary to the spirit of 
Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in 
the Western world.”85 
Second, the existence of ethnic or religious groups in the United States  
that practice gender oppressive forms of polygamy is all the more reason 
to extend civil marriage to polygamous groups.  The social and legal 
persecution of Mormon polygamy in the nineteenth century did not end 
the social practice of polygamy.86  What it did do was to eliminate the 
legal status of “wife” for all but first wives.87  As a result all secondary 
wives lost their legal claim for support and their children became 
illegitimate. Unless we are now willing to use the coercive force of the 
law to ensure that there simply are no polygamous relationships, some 
women will in fact participate in plural marriages in the United States.  
Failure to extend civil marriage to plural marriages leaves them 
unprotected by marriage and divorce law.  Women who enter plural 
marriages without the benefit of legal divorce have substantially 
restricted exit options from those marriages, since they are not legally 
entitled to make claims for alimony or fair property distribution.  For 
this reason, even those who are most committed to the belief that 
polygamy will be practiced in gender-oppressive forms should think 
 
 82. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890); see also BABST, supra note 21, at 
96 (quoting Davis v. Beason and discussing the case’s relevance to “shadow 
establishment”). 
 85. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 
136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890); see also BABST, supra note 21, at 97 (quoting the case and 
discussing the case’s relevance to “shadow establishment”).  Babst argues that the 
persistent appeal to Christian values in court rulings with respect to interracial, 
polygamous, and same-sex marriage bars is evidence of what he calls a “shadow 
establishment” of religion in U.S. judicial practice. 
 86. See supra note 20. 
 87. Dunfey, supra note 43, at 525. 
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twice about insisting on using the denial of civil marriage as a way to 
deter that practice. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The silence about polygamy on the part of same-sex marriage advocates 
is a mistake—at least in academic circles, because the historical practice 
of polygamy is a substantial reason for rejecting the claim that there is a 
millennias-long tradition of defining marriage as between one man and 
one woman.  In addition, reflection on the similarities between the 
polygamy and same-sex marriage debates helps to illuminate the larger 
social issue of how to satisfy individuals’ multiple relational needs and 
whether the state should endorse a single form of marriage.  Finally, the 
supposedly reductio force of “And why not also polygamy?” challenges 
to same-sex marriages are most effectively met by challenging their 
underlying assumptions about the nature of polygamy. 
 
